We study information transmission between an informed expert and an uninformed decision-maker when the decision is binary and the expert does not have a systematic bias.
Introduction
In many instances, decisions are limited to a yes/no choice: CEOs have to decide whether or not to realize a project, politicians must choose to approve or reject a reform, competition authorities have to decide to clear or block a merger, or whether a practice is pro-or anti-competitive. In many of those cases, the decision-maker does not initially know the optimal decision and often has to seek advice from informed experts. 1 It is however often the case that the informed experts have their own agenda that may differ from the decision-maker's preferences. They can thus be tempted to withhold information from or transmit false information to the decision-makers in order to influence them. How they reveal their privileged information to the decision-maker will also depends on the impact of their decisions on their payoffs. In some situations, they will be engaged in a contractual relationship with the decision-maker. However, in many instance, there is no direct financial incentives for the expert who only gets "paid" (i.e., derives some utility) from the actual outcome. 2 This raises a number of questions concerning the interactions between the decision-maker and the informed experts. A first question is whether decision-maker should simply delegate the decision process to one expert (i.e., letting her decide), or try to obtain advice from one or several experts keeping for himself the power to decide. If the decision-maker decides to seek advice, the next question is to decide how sophisticated the communication mechanism should be. We try to answer these questions by adapting the standard cheap-talk model à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) to binary decisions. Cheap-talk models have often been used by political scientists to analyze how legislative rules influence information transmission. 3 They however usually assume continuous choices whereas we are interested by much simpler contexts where the decision cannot be fine-tuned and choices are binary.
In such a simple setting in which the expert is not systematically biased, we show the only information that the decision-maker can extract is whether the expert would prefer to implement the project or not. Therefore, the most informative equilibrium (if such an equilibrium exists) yields the same outcome as delegating the decision to the expert. Krishna and Morgan (2004) , building on the long cheap-talk literature initiated by Aumann and Hart (2003) , show that adding a face-to-face meeting help the decision-maker to extract more information from the single expert. We show that when decision is binary, adding such multistage bilateral communication does not improve information transmission. Thus, when using a single expert, the decision-maker does not really need to communicate with her since the ex-ante Pareto-dominant equilibrium 1 For example, CEOs routinely seek advice from marketing specialists, investment bankers or management consultants; politicians rely on advisers; competition authorities rely on case handlers but also on firms' counsels to decide on each case. 2 The way to model the interactions between the expert and the decision-maker is totally different when sidepayments can be made. See for instance Gromb and Martimort (2007) who analyze similar situations but in a principal-agent context with direct monetary transfers. 3 See for instance Krehbiel (1987 and 1989) , Austen-Smith (1993), Krishna and Morgan (2001a) or Mylovanov (2008) .
is either equivalent to letting the expert decide or not listen to her. The result that delegation is preferred to communication (at least when the expert is not too biased), derived by Dessein We then move on to the multiple experts case and show, in a simple game where the experts sequentially send one message each before the decision is taken, that communication with both experts may then improve information transmission. Indeed, although a babbling equilibrium and delegation-like equilibria again exist, there may also exist additional equilibria that rely on the messages sent by both experts. Moreover, any of these new equilibria, namely a vetopower equilibrium where a project is rejected unless both experts advise to implement it, and an implementation-power equilibrium where a project is implemented unless both experts advise against it, may well be the decision-maker's preferred outcome. Finally, we also study the possibility that experts engage in an extended back-and-forth debate and consider a rebuttal game. Krishna and Morgan (2001b) , have shown in the continuous decision case, that an extended back-and-forth debate could lead to full information revelation when the two experts have opposite biases as long as they are not "extremists". 4 We show in this paper that multiple rounds of communication do not induce the experts to reveal more useful information than a simple one round of communication in which each expert speaks only once.
The paper proceeds as follows. We start with the single expert case, looking at unilateral as well as multilateral communication (Section 2). We then move on to the multiple experts case, and consider games with a single round of communication as well as with multiple rounds (Section 3). Section 4 concludes. Formal proofs are relegated in the Appendix.
Seeking advice from one expert
We first focus on the interactions between an uninformed decision-maker (DM, he) and a perfectly informed expert (E, she). In contrast to the standard cheap-talk literature (à la Crawford and Sobel, 1982) that considers continuous decisions, we envisage binary decisions, that is, situations in which DM can only decide whether to implement a project or not.
E perfectly observes the project's "type" (θ ∈ Θ which may be multi-dimensional 5 ), while DM only knows the distribution from which this type is drawn. If the project is implemented, it generates private net benefits u DM (θ) and u E (θ) for the decision-maker and the expert respectively. We define the following subsets of Θ: 4 In a setting in which the decision-maker does not observe the experts' biases, Li and Madaràsz (2008) show (in a continuous decision setting) that nondisclosure may then dominate mandatory disclosure. 5 Contrary to the literature on multi-dimensional cheap-talk in which the "dimension of conflict" influences the decision-maker's ability to extract information from the expert (see for instance Battaglini (2002) and Levy and Razin (2007) ), in our setting, dimensionality does not matter. Because choices are only binary, what really matters is the utility derived by the players from the decision-making process and therefore it boils down to a one-dimensional problem.
•
For the sake of simplicity, we only consider generic versions of the game. 6 
Unilateral Communication, Delegation and Centralization
We start with a standard unilateral communication game G (Θ) in which E sends a message m (θ) to DM, who then chooses his strategy, i.e., chooses, for each message m, the probability δ (m) that the project is implemented. As it is common in cheap-talk games, there always exists a babbling (i.e., non-informative) equilibrium: anticipating that DM never listens to her messages, transmitting a non-informative signal is an optimal strategy for E; and, given that the messages are non-informative, it is indeed optimal for DM to base his decision on his prior beliefs. This non-revealing equilibrium thus yields the same outcome as centralization (i.e., not using any expert).
We now focus on equilibria in which some information is revealed which requires that there exist at least two messages for which DM's decision differ. We denote m + (resp., m − ) a message for which the probability that the project is implemented is the highest (resp., lowest). When E wants the project to be implemented (i.e., θ ∈ E + ) sending the message m + is an optimal strategy as it maximizes the chances that the project goes through. Similarly, when she prefers not to implement the project (i.e., θ ∈ E − ), sending m − is an optimal strategy. 7 Given that we focus on generic versions of the game, DM's optimal strategy must be a pure strategy, and, we must therefore have δ (m + ) = 1 and δ (m − ) = 0. This is indeed DM 's optimal strategy if and only if:
This partially-revealing equilibrium thus yields the same outcome as delegating the decisionpower to the expert (in this equilibrium DM always chooses E's preferred action). Moreover, this delegation-like equilibrium ex-ante Pareto-dominates -whenever condition (C) is satisfied -the centralization-like equilibrium: it is obvious that E prefers the delegation-like equilibrium since her optimal action is always selected. Moreover, when "centralization" implies that no project is implemented, DM also prefers "delegation" in which projects in E + are implemented
Similarly, when centralization implies that all projects are implemented, delegation ensures that projects in E − are not implemented, which is better for DM
The next proposition summarizes the previous results. 8 6 In particular, the sets of values of θ for which uDM (θ) = 0 or uE (θ) = 0 are of measure 0, and
For the projects such that uE (θ) = 0, E is indifferent while DM 's might not be indifferent. However, since we only consider generic versions of the game, we can abstract from considering such projects. 8 Note that there always exist many equilibria where E plays mixed strategies, but these are all outcomeequivalent to either centralization-like or delegation-like equilibria. Indeed, whenever there exist multiple signals for which the probabilities that DM implements the project are identical, E can always randomize over those signals. 9 Whenever the expert's bias is sufficiently small to ensure that an informative equilibrium exists. 1 0 To do without it without communication, the decision-maker only needs to be able to commit on a simple mechanism, either not using an expert at all, or commit to delegate the decision-power to the expert. If the decision-maker can credibly commit to more sophisticated strategies (i.e., decisions that would depends on the signal he received), the game would be totally different. For instance, suppose that the first stage reveals whether θ belongs to one of two subsets Θ 1 and Θ 2 , and that DM and E anticipate, that in both subgames, they will coordinate on the centralization-like equilibrium (of the game G (Θ i ), with i = 1, 2) in which no project is ever implemented. In this case, revealing the information during the first stage does not affect the overall outcome, i.e., no project is implemented. Moreover, for centralization-like equilibria (without implementation) to exist, we must have: E θ (1 θ∈Θ i u DM (θ)) < 0 for any i = 1, 2. But this implies that E θ (u DM (θ)) < 0, and centralization without implementation is an equilibrium of the simple game G (Θ). Obtaining more "information" is therefore useless. A similar argument applies if DM and E coordinate on the same outcome (centralization with implementation or delegation) in both subgames. Suppose instead, that they anticipate that they will coordinate on the centralization-like equilibrium with implementation if θ ∈ Θ 1 , but on centralization without implementation if θ ∈ Θ 2 . In this case, it would be optimal for E to transmit a different message when θ ∈ E + and when θ ∈ E − . The overall outcome is therefore the same than in a delegation-like equilibrium. Moreover, the existence conditions of the two centralization equilibria for Θ 1 = E + and Θ 2 = E − , imply that delegation is also an equilibrium of G (Θ). In the same vein, any certain combination of different equilibria for the two subgames generate an outcome equivalent to delegation and the existence conditions imply that delegation is also an equilibrium of G (Θ).
In order to generate a new outcome (and not only a new equilibrium), it must be the case that, in at least one of the subgames, say following a signal that θ ∈ Θ i , delegation is a possible equilibrium of G (Θ i ), and that DM and E will "randomize" over the two equilibria (centralization and delegation) of this game G (Θ i ). 12 Formally, this can be done in a similar way than the "partition equilibrium" of Krishna and Morgan (2004) : during the face-to-face meeting, E and DM send messages (i, A E ) and A DM respectively. The first part of E's message (i) transmits information revealing that θ belongs to the subset Θ i , whereas A E and A DM are used to determine the outcome of a jointly-controlled lottery à la Aumann and Maschler (1995) . More specifically, whenever the game G (Θ i ) admits a delegation-like equilibrium, the jointly-controlled lottery determines on which of the two equilibria, E and DM coordinate. The crucial element of this additional stage is that none of the two players can unilaterally influence the outcome of this lottery. An equilibrium of this multistage communication game is thus characterized by a series of subsets Θ i (with i = 1, ..., N) and probabilities β i that E and DM coordinate on the centralization-like equilibrium of G (Θ i ) in the continuation subgame.
Consider, for simplicity, an equilibrium in which E initially reveals whether θ belongs to one of the two subsets Θ 1 and Θ 2 . 13 Suppose first that the centralization equilibria are different for the two continuation subgames G (Θ 1 ) and G (Θ 2 ). Whether one or both of these subgames admits a delegation-like equilibrium does not matter, since E can always ensure that her preferred 1 2 The unilateral communication game G (Θi) always has multiple equilibria. However, there are all outcomeequivalent to either centralization or delegation (when such an equilibrium exists). We thus restrict our attention to these two "outcomes". 1 3 The reasoning easily extends to any number of subsets.
outcome is chosen: it suffices that she initially sends messages that reveal whether θ belongs to E + or to E − . Since the existence conditions of the relevant centralization equilibria then correspond to the two conditions that guarantee that G (Θ) admits a delegation-like equilibrium, the face-to-face meeting does not generate an outcome that could not be generated in the simple unilateral communication game.
Suppose now the centralization equilibria are the same (say, projects are always implemented 14 ) for the two continuation subgames. Therefore, it must be the case, that at least one of subgames (say, G (Θ 1 )) admits a delegation-like equilibrium. The equilibria in the two continuation games are going to be different only if β 1 < β 2 ≤ 1. 15 In this case, the expert is willing to report that θ belongs to Θ 2 only if she wants the project to be implemented (i.e., θ ∈ E + ). Therefore, this equilibrium is simply equivalent to randomizing between centralization and delegation with respective probabilities β 1 and 1 − β 1 .
Moreover, the existence conditions of the various equilibria in the two subgames ensure that the game G (Θ) already admits a delegation-like equilibrium. Since centralization is always ex-ante
Pareto-dominated by delegation, randomizing between the two types of equilibria must also be ex-ante Pareto-dominated.
Moreover, we show in Appendix A that a delegation-like equilibrium always exist in the unilateral communication game when other informative equilibria exist in the multistage communication game, and that using mixed strategies does not allow to generate other equilibria.
This leads us to the following proposition. (2007)). Since the expert is risk-averse, adding noise will convince her to reveal more information to reduce uncertainty. In the binary case, it is however unlikely that this would improve information transmission. If communication is noisy, the expert will be tempted to significantly distort her 1 4 It is easy to adapt the argument to the case where the centralization equilibria are both such that no project is ever implemented. 1 5 When the game G (Θ 2 ) does not admit a delegation-like equilibrium, we must have β 2 = 1.
message
Communication with Multiple Experts
We now extend the model and allow the decision-maker to use several experts, and analyze whether using multiple sources of information can improve information transmission. We adapt the setting of Krishna and Morgan (2001b) to the binary decision case. DM can now seek advice from two perfectly informed experts, E 1 and E 2 . Expert E k 's net gain of implementing a project of type θ is denoted u k (θ). As in the single expert case, we divide the state-space Θ, in subsets on the basis of the expert's preferred actions, that is, for k = 1, 2:
We also define the following four subsets of projects:
and assume that none of these subsets is empty. Therefore, although the experts have different preferences, they do not always disagree on the action to be taken. We also assume that when the experts agree, DM also agrees with them (that is, u DM (θ) > 0 for any θ ∈ Θ ++ , and u DM (θ) < 0 for any θ ∈ Θ −− ). Although this is not the most general case, we consider it is a reasonable assumption that would apply when DM aggregates the views of various lobbying groups (e.g., u DM is a convex combination of u 1 and u 2 ).
Finally, for any T ∈ {++, +−, −+, −−}, we denote U T = E θ 1 {θ∈Θ T } u DM (θ) . Under our assumptions, U ++ > 0, U −− < 0 while U +− and U −+ can be either positive or negative. In order to simplify the presentation, we suppose that U +− = 0 and U −+ = 0.
Single Round of Communication
We first consider a simple sequential message game adapted from Krishna and Morgan (2001b) in which the two experts sequentially send publicly observable messages to the decision-maker who then decides on his best strategy. 16 Without loss of generality, we assume that E 1 is the first expert to transmit a message.
Part of the analysis done with one expert only still applies. In particular, a non-revealing, centralization-like, equilibrium always exists, and delegation-like equilibria may also exist. Consider for instance an equilibrium where DM always follows E 1 's advice ("delegation to E 1 ").
Anticipating that DM never listens to her, it is optimal for E 2 to send non-informative messages.
DM is then in the same situation as when dealing with one expert only, and this delegation-like equilibrium thus exists whenever:
1 6 Assuming that messages are sent sequentially rather than simultaneously is a simple way to limit chances that multiple equilibria co-exist. It simply serves as a first selection mechanism but does not affect the final results.
Similarly, an equilibrium equivalent to delegating the decision to E 2 exists whenever U ++ + U −+ > 0 and U +− + U −− < 0.
We now look for other (partially) informative equilibria. Since the decision is binary, each expert only cares about the messages that induce DM either to implement or to reject the project. For the purpose of the discussion, let us assume in what follows that the message-space is also binary, i.e., experts can only send one of two messages m + and m − . We also focus here on pure-strategy equilibria. We show however in Appendix B that allowing for more sophisticated messages and/or mixed strategies does not affect the outcome. Given that we do not look for "babbling equilibria", there must exist two pairs of messages that induce different decisions.
Thus, the four possible pairs of messages need to be separated into two non-empty subsets.
One possibility to "pool messages" is to have one singleton. Given that we can rename the messages if necessary, there are only two such possibilities. The first one is to give a "veto-power"
to the experts, that is, to have δ (m + , m + ) = 1 and δ (m 1 , m 2 ) = 0 for all other pairs of messages.
In that case, each expert can always ensure that the project will not be implemented. Given this decision rule, each expert has a (weakly) dominant strategy which is to reveal her preferred action, i.e., sending the message m + (resp., m − ) if θ ∈ E + i (resp., E − i ). This constitutes an equilibrium if DM's strategy is optimal given the experts' strategies, that is, if and only if is equivalent to delegating the decision to E 2 , because she can always adapt her message to the decision rule once she has observed the message sent by E 1 .
The following lemma summarizes these results:
Lemma 1 Any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential-message game is outcome equivalent to either centralization, delegation to one expert, veto-or implementation-power.
• A "babbling" equilibrium (centralization) always exists.
• An equilibrium equivalent to delegation to E 1 (resp., E 2 ) exists if and only if U ++ +U +− > 0 and U −+ + U −− < 0 (resp., U ++ + U −+ > 0 and U +− + U −− < 0).
• The veto-power equilibrium exists whenever U −+ + U +− + U −− < 0.
• The implementation-power equilibrium whenever U ++ + U −+ + U +− > 0.
Consider the "babbling" equilibrium when DM 's priors are pessimistic (E θ (u DM (θ)) < 0) , equilibrium in which all projects are rejected independently of the experts' messages. Since U ++ > 0 by assumption, the veto-power equilibrium also exists and is preferred to this nonrevealing equilibrium, both by the two experts (since only projects that generate a net benefit for each of the two experts are implemented) and by DM. Similarly, when E θ (u DM (θ)) > 0, the "babbling" equilibrium (in which all projects are implemented) is ex-ante Pareto-dominated by the implementation-power equilibrium, which exists since U −− < 0 by definition. Therefore, the "babbling" equilibrium is always ex-ante Pareto dominated.
Let us now consider the three other types of equilibria. Since conflicts exist between the two experts (i.e., when θ ∈ Θ +− ∪ Θ −+ ), it is impossible to Pareto-rank these equilibria. We thus only focus on DM and look for his preferred equilibrium. When U +− and U −+ are both positive (resp., negative), DM would like to implement a project whenever it is supported by at least one expert (resp., by both experts) and his preferred equilibrium is therefore the implementationpower (resp., veto-power) equilibrium. When U +− and U −+ have opposite signs, DM 's best option is to delegate the decision to one expert, E 1 (resp., E 2 ) whenever U +− > 0 (resp., < 0).
This discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 DM prefers a delegation-like equilibrium when U +− and U −+ have opposite signs, with delegation to E 1 (resp., E 2 ) when U +− > 0 (resp., < 0), while he favors the implementation-power (resp., veto-power) equilibrium when U +− and U −+ are both positive (resp., negative). Moreover, the "babbling" equilibrium is always ex-ante Pareto-dominated.
The existence of multiple experts may improve communication. Because the decision is binary, the experts only try to convince the decision-maker that the project has either a positive or a negative value. Therefore, their messages do not need to convey more precise information and it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for the experts to "tell the truth", i.e., inform the decisionmaker truthfully on whether they would prefer to implement the project or not. DM thus faces a difficulty only when the experts disagree and cannot identify, from the two conflicting messages, to which of the two subsets Θ +− or Θ −+ the project belongs. If his priors are such that U +− and U −+ have the same sign, say both are positive (resp. negative), DM's will decide to implement (resp. reject) them all. Given that he always follows the experts' advice when they agree, this is then equivalent to give each expert the power to implement (resp. to veto). DM thus uses the experts to identify projects on which they disagree and communication with the two experts is useful. When, U +− and U −+ have opposite signs, DM's priors coincide with one of the expert's preferred decision and using that expert is therefore sufficient to elicit the best information.
Several Rounds of Communication : Rebuttal Game
Krishna and Morgan (2001b) have shown that using several rounds of communication may help to generate a fully revealing equilibrium when experts have opposite biases. The intuition is simple: using a second expert forces the first one to reveal more information. In turn, allowing the first expert to rebutt the second message forces the second expert to reveal more information.
By playing one expert against the other, it then becomes possible to "convince" the experts to truthfully transmit information to the decision-maker. As we will show now, this result no longer holds when decisions are binary. We consider the following rebuttal game in which experts sequentially send N messages each:
(1.1) E 1 publicly sends her first message m 1 1 (θ). We now look for equilibria that generate new outcomes, i.e., new probabilities of implementation. As in the single-round game, when experts agree they select (pairs of) messages that generate either the highest (whenever θ ∈ Θ ++ ) or the lowest (whenever θ ∈ Θ −− ) probability of implementation. If adding extra rounds of communication generates new outcome, these outcome must lead to subdivisions of either Θ +− or Θ −+ , i.e., more relevant information must be transmitted by the experts. Suppose that there exist two projects, θ 1 and θ 2 , which both belong to Θ +− and for which the equilibrium probabilities of implementation differ, say
In equilibrium it must be impossible for expert E 1 to deviate at any time in order to increase the probability that project θ 2 is implemented above d 2 . In particular, this has to be true for any possible deviation at stage (1.1), including trying to mimic the message that E 1 sends in equilibrium for project θ 1 . But this would then imply, that E 2 could ensure that the probability to implement project θ 1 is at most d 2 < d 1 , a contradiction. Therefore, in any equilibrium of the N-round communication game, the equilibrium probability of implementation should be identical for all projects in Θ +− . A similar argument applies to Θ −+ .
Even with additional rounds of communication, the information transmitted by the two experts does not allow DM to subdivide Θ +− or Θ −+ in more subsets. Therefore, DM is in the same situation as in the single-round communication game. Therefore, the equilibria are identical in the two games, as are their existence conditions. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 With binary decisions, additional rounds of communication do not generate
transmission of more relevant information.
In the continuous-action model, Krishna and Morgan (2001b) show that multiple rounds of communication help generating a fully-revealing equilibrium when experts have opposing biases. The idea is in some sense the following: with one round of communication, playing one expert against the other already allows to generate a semi-revealing equilibrium for which the project's true type will be revealed for some subset of types. However, the order of play is important: for instance depending on which expert goes first, the equilibrium will be such Board and Kawamura (2007)) which is often associated to the use of a mediator is unlikely to improve the outcome in our binary-decision setting. Adding a possibility for the decision-maker to acquire hard information, either through the expert (as in Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) ) or directly (as in Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) ) may help the expert(s) to persuade the decisionmaker in our context. However, as long as the hard information available to the principal (or the expert(s)) is not too precise in this sense that conflicts may still exist, our results should at least partially extend.
As in the standard cheap-talk games, there exist equilibria in which the first stage of communication ("face-to-face meeting") is uninformative. Therefore, the equilibria of the game G (Θ) remain part of an equilibrium (in addition the first stage is totally uninformative) of the face-to-face game and the existence conditions remain unchanged.
We now consider other equilibria which may exist with a face-to-face meeting. Without loss of generality, suppose that these equilibria are such that β 1 < β 2 < ... < β N and N ≥ 2. 18 If β 1 = 0, E can always ensure that her preferred action is implemented by initially reporting i = 1. Any such equilibrium is therefore outcome-equivalent to delegation. Suppose from now on that β 1 > 0. When E initially reports i, her expected utility is:
where d i denotes the probability that a project in Θ i is implemented) in the non-revealing equilibrium of G (Θ i ), that is:
Let us denote I 0 = {i|d i = 0} and I 1 = {i|d i = 1}. If I 0 and I 1 are both non-empty, the expert can always ensure that her preferred action is implemented. Indeed, it suffices to report i ∈ I 1 (resp., I 0 ) whenever θ ∈ E + (resp., θ ∈ E − ). Any such equilibrium is therefore outcomeequivalent to delegation and exists if and only if for each i ∈ I 1 (resp., I 0 ), all projects are implemented (resp., no project is ever implemented) in the (pure-strategy) non-revealing equilibrium of G (Θ i ), that is, for any i ∈ I 1 (resp., I 0 ), E θ 1 {θ∈Θ i } u DM (θ) > 0 (resp., < 0). This implies that the following two conditions are satisfied:
that is:
which in turn implies that G (Θ) admits a delegation-like equilibrium.
If I 1 is empty, DM rejects all projects whenever the non-informative equilibrium of G (Θ i ) is played in the continuation game (i.e., with probability β i ). Any project θ ∈ E − is thus rejected.
For any θ ∈ E + , E reports i = 1 in order to minimize the probability that the project is rejected (i.e., in order to minimize β i ). Such an equilibrium exists if and only if: For all values of θ ∈ Θi, the expert is indifferent between messages revealing that θ belongs to any of the subsets Θi,j since this does not affect the final outcome. We can thus aggregate these subsets into the initial subset Θi without affecting the equilibrium outcome. We thus only focus on equilibria for which all the probabilities are different.
Since for any i > 1, Θ i ∩ E − = Θ i , we must also have:
which implies that G (Θ) admits a delegation-like equilibrium, and moreover this equilibrium is ex-ante Pareto dominant. Indeed, delegation is always preferred by E, and DM's expected payoff in this equilibrium is equal to β 1 E θ 1 {θ∈E + } u DM (θ) which is lower than his expected payoff in the delegation-like equilibrium (i.e., E θ 1 {θ∈E + } u DM (θ) ).
A similar argument holds when I 0 is empty, inverting the roles played by E + and E − .
Besides, DM 's expected payoff is then:
and delegation is again ex-ante Pareto dominant.
We only focused until now on pure-strategy equilibria. Considering mixed-strategies is now more complex than in the one-round case since the subsets Θ i are endogenously defined and the game G (Θ i ) may well be non-generic. For instance, if Θ i is such that E θ 1 {θ∈Θ i ∩E + } u DM (θ) = 0 and E θ 1 {θ∈Θ i ∩E − } u DM (θ) < 0, centralization (no project is implemented) and delegation are equilibria of the game G (Θ i ). However, there also exist multiple mixed-strategy equilibria: centralization-like. Indeed, anticipating that their messages will never be taken into consideration, it is optimal for the experts to send non-informative messages. In return, it is optimal for DM to make his decision based on his priors. Given that we only look at generic versions of the game, such an equilibrium must lead to all projects being implemented (whenever E θ (u DM (θ)) > 0) or none of them being implemented (whenever E θ (u DM (θ)) < 0). For any θ ∈ Θ ++ , the two experts agree to implement the project and will therefore want to maximize the chances that it gets through. Therefore, sending messages m + 1 and m + 2 is an optimal strategy and, in equilibrium it must be the case that any project in Θ ++ is implemented with probability d + . Similarly, any project in Θ −− must be implemented with probability d − .
